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ABSTRACT * 
This paper evaluates the historical influence of energy prices on a series of measures of environmental and economic 
performance for a panel of French manufacturing establishments over the period 1997-2010. The focus on energy 
prices is motivated by the fact that changes in environmental and energy policies have been dominated by substantial 
reductions in discounts for large consumers, making the evaluation of each policy in isolation exceedingly difficult. To 
identify price effects, we construct a shift-share instrument that captures only the exogenous variation in establishment-
specific energy prices. Our results highlight a trade-off between environmental and economic goals: although a 10 
percent increase in energy prices brings about a 6 percent reduction in energy consumption and to a 11 percent 
reduction in CO2 emissions, such an increase also has a modestly negative impact on employment (-2.6 percent) and 
very small impact on wages and productivity. The negative employment effects are mostly concentrated in energy-
intensive and trade-exposed sectors. Simulating the effect of a carbon tax, we show that job losses for the most 
exposed sectors can be quite large. However, these effects are upper bounds and we show that they are significantly 
mitigated in multi-plant firms by labor reallocation across establishments. 
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1 Introduction
The impact of environmental policies on firm performance has been a long-
standing and controversial topic in the political debate, especially so because
urgent responses to climate change should be given in times of tightening gov-
ernment budgets and increasing competitive pressure from emerging countries
(EEA, 2014). While stringent environmental policies produce valuable benefits
for society as a whole in terms of reduced environmental externalities, their im-
pact on industrial production, employment and productivity is often cited as
the main barrier to an ambitious implementation of such policies. It is therefore
much needed to provide robust empirical evidence on the joint impacts of such
policies on firm’s environmental and economic performance. New evidence is
particularly important to enhancing our limited understanding of the macroeco-
nomic and firm-level responses triggered by climate change mitigation policies
(e.g. carbon pricing) that are predicted to increase the cost of energy (Aldy and
Pizer, 2015).
This paper pursues this goal by investigating the responses of French man-
ufacturing establishments to changing energy prices over a variety of socio-
economic and environmental variables. The historical experience of French es-
tablishments between 1997 and 2010 represents a unique opportunity to forecast
the expected impact of ambitious carbon pricing policies put in place by the
French government with the Energy Transition Law of 2015 (and planned by all
countries that ratified the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation). Our
analysis is based on three rich datasets provided by the French Statistical Office
(INSEE): the survey EACEI (Enqueˆte sur les consommations d’e´nergie dans
l’industrie) on energy purchase and consumption (by energy source) of French
manufacturing establishments, DADS (De´claration Annuelle des donne´es So-
ciales) on employment and wage data of French establishments and FARES-
FICUS on firms’ balance sheets (see Appendix A). For the identification of the
energy price effects, we construct a shift-share instrument that captures only
the exogenous variation of establishment-specific energy prices. We motivate
the choice of energy prices showing that, although significant policy changes oc-
curred in France during the last decade, these changes have been dominated by
a substantial reduction in quantity discounts for large industrial consumers of
electricity and gas, making the evaluation of each policy in isolation exceedingly
difficult.
Our results reveal a trade-off between environmental and economic goals
due to changing energy prices. We estimate that a 10-percent increase in
establishment-level energy prices brings about a 6.4 percent reduction in en-
ergy consumption and a 11.5 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. At the same
time, the same 10-percent increase in energy prices also has a small negative
impact on employment (-2.6 percent) and to a lesser extent on wages (-0.4 per-
cent, but this effect is unstable across sub-samples) and firm’s productivity (1.1
percent, but at a statistical level that is only barely significant). The negative
employment effects differ across sectors in terms of their energy intensity and
exposure to international trade, with the effect being larger in magnitude for
energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors. Simulating the effect of the planned
French carbon tax, we show that job losses in the more exposed sectors can be
quite large.
The academic literature has contributed extensively to the identification
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and quantification of possible trade-offs between environmental and economic
goals. According to the neoclassical view of the firm, environmental regulation
introduces an additional constraint on the firm’s maximization problem, thus
resulting in reduced efficiency, lower production and employment (Palmer et al.,
1995; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). On the other hand, by altering the relative prices
of polluting inputs with respect to other inputs, higher energy prices will induce
innovation directed at reducing the demand for more polluting energy sources,
a trend documented at the aggregated level for the US by (Hassler et al., 2015).
However, even in a directed technical change framework (Acemoglu et al., 2012),
sustained emission reductions and long-run growth are compatible only under
certain specific conditions on the elasticity of substitution between dirty and
clean inputs. Theoretically, well-designed environmental regulation can lead
to benefits exceeding compliance costs and thus to a positive impact on firm
competitiveness only in the presence of bounded rational firms, as postulated by
the Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Indeed, new regulations
reveal opportunities for innovation, organizational improvements and changes
in the input mix that were not yet considered by managers.
Although we also use productivity and wages to measures the establishment’s
economic performance, employment is the most important policy objective that
may collide with environmental goals, and thus, employment is our primary
measure of economic performance. Three main mechanisms govern the rela-
tionship between labor demand and energy prices as proxies of environmental
regulation (Berman and Bui, 2001; Morgenstern et al., 2002). First, higher en-
ergy prices should negatively affect overall production and thus labor demand.
Second, more expensive energy will be substituted with other inputs, such as
labor or capital. Third, induced innovations contribute to both mitigate the
decrease in output and enhance the substitutability among inputs. As a result,
determining the sign and magnitude of the cross-elasticity between energy prices
and labor demand remains an unresolved empirical question.
Note also that the aggregate effects of changes in energy price on labor
demand depends also on general equilibrium effects and compositional change
both within and between sectors (Morgenstern et al., 2002). At the industry
level, for instance, a compositional effect may result in a faster output growth
in firms with a lower share of polluting inputs as these firms will become rel-
atively more competitive.1 Given the difficulties in using the EACEI survey,
which contains information for approximately 10000 establishments per year, to
construct measures of energy price at a more aggregate level, we cannot account
for these general equilibrium effects in our main empirical analysis. However,
we provide an initial illustration of compositional effects, documenting a signifi-
cant within-firm and across-establishments energy and labor relocations, which
likely mitigate the estimated negative effect of energy price (and environmental
policies) on labor and energy demand.
Our paper is related to the growing literature on the evaluation of environ-
mental policies. Descheˆnes (2011) estimates a negative cross-elasticity (approx.
1At the macro level, structural change and international trade are likely to induce a shift in
production and consumption from pollution-intensive sectors to less-polluting sectors. How-
ever, the literature documents that these effects are usually less important than within-sector
technical effects (Levinson, 2015; Shapiro and Walker, 2015), with the distinct exception of the
paper of (Cherniwchan et al., 2017) which accounts also for the firm-level emissions embedded
in intermediate imports.
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-0.16) of employment to electricity prices using within-state variation in such
prices for the US. Using sector-level German data, Cox et al. (2014) also es-
timate a negative cross-elasticity of labor to energy prices, but the elasticity
changes sign when conditioning on output. Aldy and Pizer (2015) find similar
negative but relatively modest effects of energy prices on production and net
import for a panel of US manufacturing sectors. Although these studies do not
tackle the issue of endogeneity of energy prices, their findings are qualitatively
similar to those of related studies exploiting exogenous geographical variation in
command-and-control regulation, e.g. the US Clean Air Act (Greenstone, 2002;
Walker, 2011; Curtis, 2017). Kahn and Mansur (2013) study the determinants
of industry location for US counties sharing the same border over a period char-
acterized by a sharp decline in US manufacturing employment, 1998-2009. They
find that pollution-intensive and energy-intensive industries are highly sensitive
to nonattainment designation and electricity prices, respectively.
Fewer papers use firm-level data to evaluate the effect of environmental poli-
cies. For the US, two recent papers use plant-level data to estimate the effect
of changes in environmental regulation on worker’s earnings (Walker, 2013) and
productivity (Greenstone et al., 2012), corroborating the general result that
these regulations have negative economic impacts. For European countries,
Martin et al. (2014) evaluate the impact of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) on
a panel of UK manufacturing plants. Partially in contrast with previous studies,
their results suggest a positive but insignificant impact of being subject to the
CCL on employment, including when accounting for the endogeneity of the tax,
but a negative effect on energy intensity is found. Flues and Lutz (2015) and
Gerster (2017) both evaluate the impact of a discontinuous change in electric-
ity taxation on the performance of German manufacturing establishments by
means of a regression discontinuity design and a fuzzy regression discontinu-
ity design, respectively. In both cases, establishments around the discontinuity
did not experience any different performance in terms of gross output, export,
employment, value added or investments (see also, von Graevenitz et al., 2017).
Other recent contributions look at the impact of the EU-ETS on firms’
competitiveness, with mixed results. Wagner et al. (2014) evaluate the impact
of the EU-ETS on the performance of French manufacturing plants, finding
the impact to be negative and significant on employment, while no significant
effect was found on employment by Petrick and Wagner (2014) and Anger and
Oberndorfer (2008) for German firms. Abrell et al. (2011), on the other hand,
evaluated the impact of the EU-ETS on a panel of European firms in different
countries, finding no effect on profits and value added and a negative small and
significant effect on employment.
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, in contrast to the papers
reviewed above, which exploit the variation in firm-level environmental policy
driven by specific and sometimes small regulatory changes affecting a small
(and often non-randomly selected) fraction of firms, our paper employs a more
pervasive indicator of potential exposure to environmental policies, i.e. energy
prices.2 Second and crucial to validating our choice of energy prices, we correlate
2This choice follows leading contributions in the literature (see, among others, Newell
et al., 1999; Popp, 2002; Aldy and Pizer, 2015; Ley et al., 2016). What makes the use of
energy prices attractive is the fact that most environmental policies directed at reducing
air pollution or contributing to climate change mitigation, especially those relying on market-
based instruments, result or will result in increasing (directly or indirectly) the cost of burning
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the evolution of energy prices in the French manufacturing sector with both
policy- and nonpolicy-related drivers. We show that as in the related paper of
Davis et al. (2013) the latter (notably changes in quantity-discounts) dominates
over the former, and thus acts as an effective increase in policy stringency for
energy-intensive firms. Third, we address the important issue of endogeneity in
the estimates of the causal effect of energy prices on establishments’ economic
and environmental performance. In doing so, we propose a flexible shift-share
instrument that is easily amenable to be used in other contexts and can be used
to simulate the effect of climate policies. Finally, our rich database allows us to
start investigating the within-firm reallocation effects, thus contributing both to
the debate on the role of the internal labor market as insurance against negative
shocks (Cestone et al., 2016).
[Figure 1 about here]
A further contribution of our paper is to consider the case of France, which
is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, France features low prices for
energy, especially electricity, relative to its neighboring countries. As reported
in Figure 1, the electricity price for industrial consumers belonging to differ-
ent bands of yearly consumption (year 2010, Eurostat data) was much lower
in France than in Italy and Germany, approximately 30-40 and 40-50 percent
cheaper, respectively, across different consumption bands. These systemati-
cally lower energy prices may have made the French manufacturing sector less
prepared and thus more vulnerable to changes in energy prices than the man-
ufacturing sectors of other countries. Second, the electricity and natural gas
markets experienced substantial changes due to the combination of increasing
market liberalization, setting of ambitious environmental targets and the in-
troduction of a tax on electricity (IEA, 2004, 2009). Interestingly, these policy
changes have been associated with substantial changes in the structure of energy
prices paid by different industrial costumers. This differentiated impact across
different industrial consumers is a particularly helpful source of variation to be
exploited to identify the impact of energy prices on the performance of French
manufacturing establishments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first describes a series of styl-
ized facts about energy consumption and the costs of French manufacturing,
and then, we show how changes in the regulatory framework have affected the
structure of energy prices paid by industrial costumers. Section 3 illustrates
the empirical strategy to estimate the effect of energy prices, while Section 4
discusses the main results and several extensions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The changing structure of energy prices in the
French manufacturing sector
As an essential first step toward the evaluation of the impact of energy prices on
establishments’ performance, this section analyses the extent to which energy
prices differ across establishments and identifies the drivers of this heterogeneity.
In doing so, we evaluate the association between policy changes and energy
prices at the establishment level.
fossil fuels.
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2.1 Data, measures and basic facts
The main source of information about the energy use and expenditures of French
manufacturing establishments for the period 1997-2010 is the EACEI survey.
EACEI collects detailed information on energy consumption and expenditure
by energy source (13 sources) for a representative sample of manufacturing es-
tablishments with at least 10 employees. Further details about the EACEI
survey are discussed in Appendix A.
Similar to Davis et al. (2013), what we label as energy price is just the average
unit cost of energy, which is the ratio between total energy expenditure and total
energy consumption. This measure does not say anything about the actual price
schedule for different energy sources within each establishment or the marginal
price of energy. This limitation, however, is somewhat compensated by the
advantage of having access to establishment-specific information for both energy
prices and key economic variables. In the following, we will use the word ‘price’
to refer to the unit value cost of energy, that is:
pEit =
13∑
j=1
φjitp
j
it, (1)
where φjjit is the share of energy consumption of source j (i.e. natural gas,
electricity, etc.) on total energy consumption, while pjit is the average unit value
cost of energy source j paid by establishment i at time t.3
As is clear from equation 1, cross-establishment heterogeneity in energy
prices primarily depends on the heterogeneity in the energy mix. Indeed, for
a given vector of prices for all possible energy sources, establishments with dif-
ferent energy mixes will pay a different average price per kWh equivalent of
energy. Figure 2 reports the energy mix of the ‘average’ French manufactur-
ing establishment, and these values appear quite stable throughout the period
1997-2010. The average French manufacturing establishment relies substan-
tially on the consumption of electricity (mostly from nuclear, e.g. 77 percent in
2013), which accounts for approximately 60 percent of total energy consump-
tion and has modestly increased by approximately 3 percent over the period
considered. The second most important energy input is natural gas, which ac-
counts for approximately 20-30 percent of total energy consumption and has also
gained importance with an increase of approximately 5 percent over the period
considered. Conversely, the share of heating oil decreased substantially from
approximately 12 percent in 1997 to approximately 5 percent in 2000. Finally,
other fuels (heavy oil, oil, steam, coke, other gas, coke-petrol, and lignite) only
represent a very small share of the energy input for the typical establishment.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Changes in the (establishment-specific) prices for different sources represent
the other main source of variation in the average energy price. Figure 3 sum-
marizes the trends of nominal average unit cost of energy (euro per kWh) for
different energy sources: total energy , electricity, gas and other sources.4 First,
3Energy consumption for all energy sources has been converted into kWh-equivalent values.
4‘Gas’ includes natural gas, butane-propane and other gas; ‘Other’ includes heating oil,
heavy oil, oil, steam, coke, coke-petrol and lignite.
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notice that, on average, all energy prices increased substantially over the time
period considered. Second, the timing of the price increases is similar for both
gas and electricity. The price of electricity was declining until 2003, after which
a sharp increase is observed, while the prices of natural gas and other sources
started to increase in 2004 reflecting the global upward trend in fossil-fuel prices.
Third, electricity is the most expensive energy source, but the gap in the price
per kWh between electricity and other energy sources shrank between 1997 and
2010. To illustrate, one kWh of electricity was approximately 3.4 times more ex-
pensive than a kWh of gas in 1997 and approximately 1.9 times more expensive
in 2010.
[Table 1 about here]
Even though aggregate energy prices and, even more so, the energy mix
appear to be rather stable over time, what matters to our analysis is the degree
of across establishments heterogeneity in energy intensities, prices and mixes.
Energy intensity, i.e. the incidence of energy-related costs measured5, is a good
proxy of the degree of exposure (of an establishment or of a sector) to policy-
driven changes in energy prices, while the energy mix is a good proxy of the
establishment’s technology.
Table 1 reports the averages and standard deviations (in parentheses) of
these energy-related measures broken down by sector (2-digit NACE rev 2). The
bottom line is that energy intensities, prices and mixes all display substantial
variation both between and within sectors.
In more detail, the first column shows that, on average, for each euro paid
in wages, the typical French manufacturing establishment pays 0.217 euro for
purchasing energy. The very large coefficient of variation in energy intensity
(2.2) is driven by both between- and within-sector heterogeneity. To illustrate,
the ratio between energy expenditure and wages is 0.081 for Wearing apparel
and 0.381 for Basic metals, while the within-sector coefficient of variation is
always much greater than one. The heterogeneity in average energy prices (sec-
ond column), electricity prices (third column) and gas prices (fourth column)
prices is smaller than the heterogeneity in the incidence of energy costs: the
aggregate coefficients of variation are 0.33, 0.26 and 0.33, respectively. How-
ever, again both cross-sector and within-sector heterogeneity matter. Finally,
the fifth and the sixth columns of Table 1 reveal that the documented stability
in the aggregate energy mix masks a substantial heterogeneity both within and
across establishments. This finding is particularly important for our estimation
strategy: changes in the relative prices of different energy sources have het-
erogeneous impacts on the average unit cost of energy of establishments with
different energy mixes and similar energy intensities.
2.2 Heterogeneity of energy prices across manufacturing
establishments
To evaluate in greater detail the drivers of price heterogeneity across estab-
lishments, we closely follow the the approach used by Davis et al. (2013), who
5This is measured as the ratio between energy expenditures and the wage bill. We use total
wages paid as the denominator as this is the only monetary variable that is systematically
collected for all establishments in our sample.
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analyze electricity prices across US manufacturing establishments for the US
over the period 1963-2000. The authors document a remarkable dispersion in
energy prices across US establishments and show that the decline in such dis-
persion is mostly associated with a reduction in quantity discounts for large
industrial consumers. Here, we extend their analysis considering both total av-
erage energy prices and electricity alone given that the French electricity market
has been affected by substantial regulatory changes over the time period of our
analysis.
[Figure 4 about here]
Our measure of prices dispersion is the purchase-weighted standard devi-
ation across establishments of the logarithm of energy prices for each year in
our sample. In Figure 4, the standard deviation of total energy prices declines
from approximatively 55 log points in the first years of the series to about 30
log points in the last years. As for the average electricity prices, we observe no
clear trend up to 2003 and a downward trend starting in 2004. Moreover, the
dispersion in electricity prices is systematically smaller than that of total energy
prices.6 This reflects the fact that total energy prices also incorporate hetero-
geneity in the energy mix across establishments. Overall, what we observe for
total and electricity energy prices is both a great degree of cross-establishment
heterogeneity and a substantial reduction in this heterogeneity, especially over
the last six years of our series.
[Figure 5 about here]
As next step, we decompose the overall standard deviation of energy prices
into three main structural components: i) quantity discount or size of energy
consumption (by using year-specific deciles of energy consumption), ii) sectors
(2-digit NACE rev 2), iii) regions (NUTS2).7 Te results for total energy prices
(top panel) and electricity prices (bottom panel) are reported in Figure 5. At
the beginning of the sample period, both the sectoral and the size component
explain alone approximately 70 percent of the dispersion in energy prices (total
and electricity), while geographical variation accounts for only 38 percent of
total price dispersion. Notably, although we also observe a decline in the im-
portance of the sectoral component, the overall decline in price dispersion has
been primarily driven by a sharp decline (from 70 to less than 50 percent) in the
importance of the size component, which mostly occurred after 2004. Compared
with results for the US (Davis et al., 2013), quantity discounts play not only a
more important role in explaining price heterogeneity, but also display a more
marked decline.
6Note also that the dispersion in electricity price is around 10 log points below the values
estimated by Davis et al. (2013) for the US in the same period. This finding can be explained
by the significantly lower geographical dispersion of French electricity prices compared to that
of the US prices.
7Practically, we first take the yearly average of total energy price and electricity prices
(weighted for sampling weights multiplied by total energy consumption and electricity con-
sumption of the establishment, respectively) within each category of the component (e.g.,
within each sector). We then compute for each year the standard deviation of log energy and
electricity prices across categories of the selected dimension. Finally, we take the ratio between
the dimension-specific standard deviation and the total (across-establishments) standard de-
viation. This ratio describes the share of price heterogeneity explained by each component.
As we evaluate all components separately, the components do not sum up to one.
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[Figure 6 about here]
Using a simple variance decomposition, the evolution of the role of quantity
discount is not isolated from that of the sector and region components. To
reinforce the basic facts presented above, we evaluate the evolution over time
of the elasticity of energy price to the quantity of energy consumed conditional
on a set of intervening factors. In doing so, we estimate this cross-sectional
elasticity conditional on sector dummy variables (2-digit NACE) and region
dummy variables. The absolute values of the estimated elasticities (which are
all negative) are reported in Figure 6. The average estimated elasticity for total
energy prices declines by almost 1/3 from 0.16 to 0.11. This is a remarkable
difference as the range of variation in energy consumption is large and would
hence imply robust quantity discounts. For instance, the price discount for
one interquartile range in total energy consumption was of approximately 36.5
percent in 1997 and only 23.1 percent in 2010. The elasticity of electricity
prices to the quantity of electricity that is consumed is slightly smaller, but
follows exactly the same trend declining from 13 to approximately 8-9 percent.
The difference in the level of the elasticity between total energy and electricity
reflects the fact that large companies are likely to use a more differentiated
energy mix and thus accumulate discounts on several energy inputs. It is worth
emphasizing that as for the other series, the acceleration in the decrease of
quantity discounts occurred from 2004 onward. As shown in Appendix C, the
reduction in quantity discounts occurred also within establishments controlling
for establishment-level fixed effects and other covariates.
The next section tries to connect the evidence on quantity discount reduc-
tions with the policy and regulatory changes that occurred in the time span
considered by our study.
2.3 Regulatory and policy changes in the energy sector
The energy sector was characterized in the years 1990s and 2000s by very im-
portant regulatory changes. As in other countries, these changes were aimed at
improving the functioning of market mechanisms within the concentrated and
vertically integrated French energy sector and at reducing the environmental
impact of energy consumption in the industrial sector.
[Figure 7 about here]
Deregulation of Energy Markets. To provide a grasp of the extent of changes
in the regulatory burden in the electricity and gas markets, Figure 7 displays the
OECD index of Product Market Regulation of the two sectors for France over
the period 1997-2010. The index measures the importance of various dimensions
of regulations in a comparable way across OECD countries. The electricity sec-
tor was ‘fully regulated’ (PMR=6) in France up to 1998, after which various
reforms contributed to liberalizing the French electricity market. According
to the IEA (IEA, 2004, 2009), the three most important reforms in this re-
spect were: the creation of an independent transmission system operator, the
non-discriminatory third-party access to the network and the transformation
of EDF from an EPIC (e´tablissement public industriel et commercial) into a
limited company (socie´te´ anonyme) in 2004. A similar process of reforms also
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substantially changed the French market for natural gas with the transforma-
tion of GDF into a limited company and the unbundling and opening to third
party access to underground storage of natural gas. These reforms, despite the
continuing dominant position exerted by the (mostly) publicly-owned EDF and
GDF, allowed the entry of new players in the market and induced changes in
the market structure and in the tariffs offered to customers.
Tax to support renewable energy. Another very important change in the
regulation of the electricity market was represented by the introduction in 2002
of an electricity tax to finance renewable energy generation, “Contribution au
Service Public de l’Electricite´” (CSPE henceforth). The tax is levied on all final
consumers of electricity and is aimed at refunding to EDF the costs due to the
provision of public services. More specifically, the revenue is primarily (but not
exclusively) used for covering the obligatory purchase by EDF of electricity from
renewable energy and co-generation.8 The tax per MWh increased rapidly over
the last decade growing to 3 euro in 2002, 3.3 euro in 2003, increasing to 4.5
euro in 2004, 9 euro in 2011, 10.5 euro in 2012, 13.5 euro in 2013, 16.5 euro in
2014 and 19.5 euro in 2015.9 Big industrial consumers of electricity are partly
exempted from the contribution. A first limit at the establishment level is set on
the total annual tax: the limit was set to 500,000 euro in 2003 and grew up to
569,418 euro in 2013. An additional plafond is guaranteed at the company level:
the part of tax paid that exceeds 0.5 percent of the company’s total value added
is reimbursed in the following year for those companies that consume more than
7 GWh per year. Finally, consumption of self-produced electricity is exempted
up to 240 GWh per year. This means that the marginal tax after the limit is
reached is zero while the actual average tax on each kilowatt for big industrial
plants is substantially smaller than that for smaller electricity consumers.
The ceteris paribus impact of the tax on quantity discount should have been
unequivocally positive as big purchasers of electricity receive a substantial ex-
emption.10 However, given that EDF remained a de facto monopolist in the
French electricity market even after the deregulation, the monopolist (EDF)
could have simply adjusted price-discounts and tariffs to fully appropriate the
tax exceptions for large consumers. In Appendix D, we directly assess the
impact of the tax on energy prices around the threshold using a regression dis-
continuity design. Surprisingly, we observe that establishments right above the
limit threshold experience an increase in price with respect to establishments
right below the threshold. This increase represents a first evidence that reduc-
tions in quantity-discounts appear to be more important than policy reforms in
changing the structure of French energy prices.
EU Emission Trading Scheme. Finally, European policy to tackle climate
change may have significantly influenced energy prices over the period consid-
8The other two main goals of the CSPE are as follows: i) subsidizing electricity production
and distribution in regions (i.e. oversees territories) not connected to the mainland network;
ii) covering the contribution for special electricity prices granted for ‘products for primary
needs’ and poor citizens.
9The tax represents a relevant component of the tax-inclusive electricity prices: 6 percent
in 2002, 6.9 percent in 2003, 8.6 percent (on average) for 2004-2010.
10To illustrate, an establishment consuming 150 GWh per year in 2013 would have paid a
total tax of 2.025 million euro. However, thanks to the limit set at 569,418 euro, the actual
tax rate per MWh for this establishment was 3.79 euro per MWh instead of 13.5 euro per
MWh paid by establishments below the limit threshold. The average discount on per-MWh
consumed is thus approximately 72 percent.
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ered by our analysis. The main climate policy at the European level is the
EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). The scheme was approved in 2001,
its first pilot phase started in 2005 and its second phase began in 2008.11 By
imposing a price on GHG emissions for establishments that pass certain sector-
and process-specific thresholds of installed capacity, the EU-ETS increases the
overall price paid to burn fossil fuels and has an indirect influence on the price
of electricity that is produced with fossil fuels.12
Estimating Policy Drivers. As a final step of this overview of the role of
energy-related policies in driving energy prices, we assess the combined role of all
policy-related drivers on energy prices and mixes, our key proxy of technology.
We use a specification similar to that described in Equation 8:
Yit = αi + Policy
′
itβ +X
′
itγ + it, (2)
where Yit is the outcome variable (either average energy price or the share of
gas or electricity) in year t for establishment i, Policy′it is a vector of firm-
specific measures of policy change (see below) for establishment i and year t, αi
is the establishment fixed effect, it is the idiosyncratic error term and Xit is a
vector of control variables that account for a variety of unobserved year-specific
effects (i.e., region-by-year and sector-by-year dummies, see the discussion after
equation 3 for details).13
We account for changes in product market regulation by building a establishment-
specific PMR index by multiplying the PMR indexes (rescaled to a range be-
tween 0 and 1) for gas and electricity by the initial establishment-specific share
of gas and electricity, respectively, in the energy mix. We also compute the
year- and establishment-specific average CSPE tax rate, also accounting for the
establishment-specific exemption. This variable is equal to zero up to year 2001,
equal to the full tax rate in 2002-2010 for establishments below the year-specific
exemption threshold and varies between the full tax rate and zero in 2002-2010
for those establishments that pass the exemption threshold. Finally, we interact
the EU ETS dummy variable (which is equal to 1 for establishments covered
by the scheme) with a dummy variable for the ‘anticipation’ period (2001-2004,
between the approval of the directive and the first year of the scheme), a dummy
variable for the first phase of the ETS (2005-2007) and a dummy variable for
the second phase of the ETS (2006-2008).
[Table 2 about here]
11Different from the first phase, the second phase had i. a higher penalty for non-compliance
(from 40 to 100 euro per ton of CO2); ii. the inclusion of N2O emissions; and iii. the possibility
of banking permits across phases.
12Another indirect effect is linked to the fact that an increase in the overall price of certain
energy sources (i.e. fossil fuels) induces firms to change their energy mix towards those energy
sources that were relatively more expensive before fossil fuels were surcharged with the permit
price (Martin et al., 2016).
13We include sector dummies (NACE rev 2, 2 digit), region dummies (NUTS2), ETS dum-
mies (equal to 1 for establishments covered by the EU ETS), a peak-exposure dummy (equal to
one for establishments that in their first year in EACEI were in the fourth quartile of the ratio
between subscribed capacity for electricity consumption - MW - and actual annual electricity
consumption - MWh) and size class dummies in the first year of observation (10-49 employ-
ees, 50-99 employees, 100-249 employees, 250-499 employees and 500 or more employees) to
control for the establishment bargaining power unrelated to energy consumption.
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The results are reported in Table 2. We focus on Column 4 where we jointly
evaluate all policies. As would be expected, the reductions in the PMR are
significantly related to reductions in energy prices. More specifically, a full
deregulation of both the gas and electricity markets would have resulted in a
reduction in the average energy prices paid by French manufacturing establish-
ments of approximately 12 percent. In line with previous evidence, an increase
in the CSPE tax rate has the counter-intuitive effect of reducing the average
energy prices as these prices have been dominated by quantity discounts reduc-
tions. A 1-euro cent increase in the tax rate per MWh reduces energy prices
by approximately 0.8 percent. Interestingly, ETS establishments experienced a
faster increase in average energy prices than other establishments already be-
fore the ETS was in place. However, as indicated by the positive and significant
coefficient of the anticipation dummy, the effect of the ETS on energy prices
was already present before the ETS was in place. Again, a likely candidate for
these differential trends is the widespread reduction in quantity discounts that
have arguably affected bigger ETS establishments more than non-ETS ones.
Finally, Columns 5 and 6 present estimates of the correlation between changes
in energy prices and in the energy mixes.14 While the EU-ETS did not have
a significant impact on the establishments’ energy mix, the CSPE induced the
expected substitution between electricity and gas.
Summary. Our estimates of the policy drivers, although not causal, are
useful to assess the conditional correlation between the introduction of new
policies and energy prices. The main conclusion is that reductions in quantity
discounts have been far more important than the introduction of new policies in
explaining the changes in the structure of energy prices of French manufactur-
ing establishments. A notable example is the inversion of the conditional and
unconditional effect of the CSPE on energy price. Our results also suggest that
it is difficult to perform separate evaluations of each single policy in presence
of monopolists, such as EDF and GDF, that used their market power to dif-
ferentiate the pass-through of the policy costs to different consumers. All this
considered, our analysis lends further support to the use of energy as best proxy
for environmental regulatory stringency.
3 Empirical strategy
This section illustrates the empirical strategy used to estimate the impact of en-
ergy price changes on establishment performance. We consider two dimensions
of establishment performance. A first set of variables refers to environmen-
tal performance: total energy consumption (in kWh, from EACEI) and CO2
emissions.15 Concerning economic variables, our primary measures are total
employment and average wage per employee in DADS (De´claration Annuelle
des Donne´es Sociales) for the population of French establishments. We link this
information to EACEI establishments by means of a unique identifier (SIRET).
As our panel of establishments is unbalanced, our primary estimation comprises
14We do not include PMR in these regressions as the establishment-level measure of PMR
is calculated using the electricity and gas share of total energy.
15We computed CO2 emissions by multiplying each energy source by its technical CO2
emission factor. Since electricity and steam do not generate any direct emissions, observations
for which all energy consisted of electricity and/or steam were automatically excluded from
the estimation sample for this variable.
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establishments that are included in the EACEI survey at least twice.16 Finally,
establishments are not required to compile and submit the balance sheet or the
income statement; thus, we cannot estimate the effect of energy prices on pro-
ductivity at the establishment level. In an extension, however, we estimate the
impact of energy prices on different measures of productivity at the firm level
for a selection of establishments that are fully observed in ECAI.
3.1 Baseline estimation framework
Our starting point is the following equation:
log(yit) = αi + β log(p
E
it) +X
′
itγ + it, (3)
where yit is the outcome variable (e.g. employment, energy) of establishment i in
year t, αi is the establishment fixed effect, p
E
it is the average cost of energy (euro
per kilowatt) of establishment i in year t, Xit is a vector of control variables
and it is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector Xit includes includes 2-
digit sector dummy variables, region dummy variables, ETS dummy variables,
peak-exposure dummy variables and size class dummy variables all interacted
with year dummy variables (see footnote 13 for a detailed definition of these
variables). Region- and sector-specific year dummies account for any kind of
unobservable demand or supply shock that hits all establishments in a region
or sector and could affect both energy prices and the outcome variables. ETS
specific year dummies account for the fact that we found systematically different
trends in energy prices between ETS and non-ETS establishments even before
the ETS was operative (see Table 2). Because an evaluation of the ETS goes
beyond the scope of this paper, we account for the ETS in a flexible manner.17
Accounting for the exposure to peak-hour electricity prices is also important
as this variable incorporates useful information about the type of technology
used by the firm, which is correlated with both energy prices and performance.
Finally, initial size class dummies interacted with year dummies are included to
capture the fact that smaller firms grow faster than bigger ones conditional on
survival (see e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2011) . As size is also correlated with energy
prices, this dynamics allows firms of different sizes to have different employment
dynamics.
If the assumption of absence of correlation between it and log(p
E
it) is satis-
fied, βˆ represents the unbiased estimate of the elasticity of the outcome variable
with respect to energy prices. Because a carbon tax has the effect of making
fossil fuels more expensive, this parameter can be directly interpreted as the
elasticity of the outcome variable with respect to the tax. It is also important
to emphasize that what we estimate is the within-establishment response to
a change in energy prices. Whatever happens to the relocation of production
16As we will discuss in section 3.2, we also exclude years 1997-1999 from the estimation
sample because we use the lagged establishment-specific energy mix to build our instrumental
variable. This means that in addition to the two observations per establishments that con-
tribute to our estimates, we also need to observe the establishment one more time to build
our IV. In Appendix B, we illustrate that there are systematic differences between establish-
ments in the estimation sample and establishments that were excluded from the estimate. In
particular, the former are larger and more energy intensive than the latter.
17A comprehensive policy evaluation on the impact of the ETS on the performance of French
establishments is done in Wagner et al. (2014).
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across establishments within the same firm or sector, or across different sectors
in response to changing energy prices is not incorporated in βˆ. Since relocation
effects are likely to mitigate the effect of price changes, our estimates are an
upper bound of the true effect of such tax. Section 4.5 represents an initial
attempt to tackle this issue.
3.2 Endogeneity issues
Endogeneity is a concern in our estimation framework due to the presence of
omitted variables. There are three types of variables that are difficult to observe
but that are likely to be correlated with both our outcome variables and energy
prices. First of all, if establishments are hit by an idiosyncratic negative demand
shock dit, they will reduce output and, in turn, reduce the demand for inputs
including energy and employment. At the same time, in presence of contracts
for energy supply (especially so for electricity and gas) that were signed before
dit was observed, a lower demand for energy will increase in the average unitary
cost of energy through a reduction in quantity-discounts.
Second, endogenous energy-saving technical change aEit is likely to simul-
taneously reduce the consumption of energy and quantity discounts offered to
firms, thus increasing the average unitary cost of energy.18 This implies that aEit
should bias the impact of energy prices on energy-related outcomes in the same
direction as dit. In contrast, the correlation between a
E
it and socio-economic
outcomes such as employment should be zero. Finally, as a response to an
increase in energy prices, technical change can facilitate the substitution of en-
ergy with labor and capital (Hassler et al., 2015), or redirect technical change
towards labor and capital (Acemoglu et al., 2012). A change in the elasticity of
substitution εit between labor and energy will further reinforce the increase in
energy prices and be positively (resp. negatively) correlated with labor (resp.
energy) demand.
To guide our expectations regarding the sign for the omitted variable bias for
labor L (our example for socio-economic outcome) and energy E (our example
for environmental outcomes), it is useful to inspect the formula of the omitted
variable bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2009):
βˆy =
Cov(yit, p
E
it)
V ar(pEit)
= βy + γy,dδp,d︸ ︷︷ ︸
-
+ γy,aEδp,aE︸ ︷︷ ︸
-
+ γy,εδp,ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ L, - E
, (4)
where δs are the coefficients of a regression of energy prices on the vector of
omitted variables [d aE ε], while γˆs are the coefficients of a regression of the
outcome variables on p, the standard controls and the vector [d aE ε]. Note first
that all the shocks are positively correlated with energy prices (that is, the δs
are all positive) and thus the sign of the biases only depend on the correlations
between the outcome and the omitted variables. The negative demand shock
should reduce the size of the estimated coefficient βˆy with respect to the true
one, βy. Indeed, γy,d is negative for both E and L. Energy-saving technical
change has no effect on L but has again a negative effect on E. The change in
the possibility of substituting energy for labor is positively correlated with L
and negatively correlated with E.
18The inducement effect of energy prices on energy-saving innovation is empirically well
documented (Popp, 2002; Hassler et al., 2015).
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As a result, the bias in the our FE estimates of βy should be clearly negative
for energy and thus, given the negative sign of βy, overestimate the magnitude
of the own-elasticity of energy demand to price. On the other hand, the di-
rection of the bias is unclear for labor and depends on the relative magnitude
of the negative bias associated with unobservable demand shocks and of the
positive bias related to the substitution of labor for energy. However, because
our estimates are conditional on survival, the second bias should dominate the
first because surviving firms are likely to have better managers who can find
solutions to transform the permanent increase in energy price in an opportunity
for employment growth (Martin et al., 2012).
One way to deal with these multiple omitted variable biases is to identify
an instrumental variable that is correlated with exogenous variation in energy
prices but that is unrelated to establishment-specific demand shocks and en-
dogenous technological responses to changes in energy prices (i.e. energy-saving
and factor substitution). To fulfill this requirement, we propose a shift-share
instrument (Bartik, 1991) that combines the nationwide prices of different en-
ergy sources with the time-invariant firm-specific energy mix. Specifically, we
weigh the average national price of each energy source for the energy mix used
by the establishment three years after its first entry in the EACEI survey. This
instrument closely resembles the average energy price as computed in equation
1:
pIVit =
13∑
j=1
2010∑
k=2000
φji,k−3p
j
t . (5)
Nationwide price variations are by construction uncorrelated with firm-specific
demand shocks, while blocking the energy mix in the initial period shuts down
the influence of endogenous technical change that mostly operates through
changes in the energy mix. The 3-years lag in computing the initial energy
mix is used to mitigate concerns that forward-looking rational managers fore-
cast the evolution of source-specific energy prices in the coming years and choose
the energy mix in year t accordingly. For this reason, the estimation sample runs
from 2000 to 2010 rather than from 1997 to 2010.
We explicitly test the validity of the exclusion restriction for what concerns
the possibility that, due to some additional unobserved factors, establishments
with different initial energy mixes exhibit different pre-trends in the outcome
variable. If this were the case, our shift-share instrument could not disentangle
the exogenous change in energy prices from pre-existing systematic differences
in trends across firms with different initial mixes. In doing so, we estimate
the differences in pre-CSPE employment (which is available in DADS for all
establishments and all years) for firms with different initial (1997) energy mixes
up to year 2001, the year before the introduction of the CSPE.19 We detect
pre-treatment differences using the following equation:
19We include only those establishments that were observed for all years in DADS between
1997 and 2001. Energy consumption and CO2 emissions cannot be evaluated here as these
variables are available for all years between 1997 and 2001 only for a very small number of
establishments, while data on employment from DADS are available for the population of
French establishments active in all years.
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log(Lit) = αi +
2001∑
t=1997
βj=gast φ
j=gas
i,t=1997 +
2001∑
t=1997
βj=elt φ
j=el
i,t=1997
+ X ′itγ + it (6)
where log(Lit) is the logarithm of employment in establishment i and year t,
αi is the establishment fixed effect, Xit is the usual set of control variables (see
footnote 13) and it is the idiosyncratic error term. We focus on the two main
sources, gas and electricity (which account for over 80 percent of total energy
consumption for the ‘average’ French manufacturing establishment), allowing
the effect of their initial shares φji,t=1997 to vary over time.
20 To detect the
existence of different pre-treatment trends, we jointly test the null hypothesis
that
ˆ
βjt are equal to zero.
The results are reported in Table 3. In column 1 we simply replace the
vector Xit with year dummies, while the results in column 2 also account for
Xit. Without accounting for Xit, we observe that firms that relied more heavily
on electricity in their energy mixes in 1997 grew significantly faster than firms
with smaller share of electricity. The F test of joint significance fails to accept
the null hypothesis of common trends for electricity with p<0.01. However,
when also accounting for our set of control variables Xit, all tests suggest that
conditional on controls no difference in pre-trends is observed for firms with
different initial energy mixes.
[Table 3 about here]
This result has two implications for our analysis. First, the reliance of our
IV on time-invariant energy mix does not bear the risk of capturing pre-existing
differences across establishments that are connected with the energy mix itself.
Second, the set of control variablesXit matters for the validity of our IV strategy.
4 Estimation results
This section is organized in five distinct sub-sections. The first presents the
main results. The second focuses on the heterogeneous responses of different
sectors. The third simulates the effect of a carbon tax. The fourth presents
firm-level results to gage the impact of energy prices on productivity, while the
fifth examines energy and workers’ relocation between establishments within the
same firm.
4.1 Main results
The baseline results are reported in 4, where we present, for each outcome
variable, results both for the simple fixed effect model and for the fixed effect
model with energy prices instrumented as described above. Across the board,
we observe that an increase in the unitary energy cost decreases the use of en-
vironmental and labor inputs. However, both the estimation bias and elasticity
vary substantially for different measures.
20Since
∑13
j=1 φ
j = 1 by definition, this is equivalent to treating the remaining sources as
the omitted category.
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[Table 4 about here]
The comparison of the two estimation methods highlights the expected large
negative bias for energy and CO2 emissions, while the bias is also large but posi-
tive for labor demand and the average wage. Sticking with our interpretation of
bias in the previous section, the latter result highlights the ability of surviving
establishments to endogenously adapt the technology in use in order to ease the
substitution of labor for energy. Notice that absent a convincing way to evaluate
the drivers of establishment’s survival with our data, our estimates are condi-
tioned on survival and thus consider only the best-performing establishments
that are also more likely to innovate. By isolating only the exogenous variation
in energy prices, our IV is able to replicate what would have happened if these
establishments were not adapting their input mix to the new conditions.
Concerning the size of our effects, the IV estimate of the price elasticity of
energy consumption is approximately -0.64. This number is larger, in absolute
terms, than that estimated in sector-level studies.21 However, when looking at
micro-level estimates our results lie within the range of elasticities estimated
in the existing literature.22 Interestingly, CO2 emissions are more sensitive to
energy prices than energy consumption (elasticity of -1.15 in the IV specifi-
cation). This result implies that CO2-intensive establishments appear to be
more price sensitive than electricity-intensive ones. As would be expected, the
cross-elasticities of employment and the average wage to energy prices (-0.26
and -0.04 respectively) are much smaller than the own-elasticities estimated for
energy and CO2. While the results for employment are in line with those esti-
mated by Kahn and Mansur (2013) (-0.227 for industries with average energy
intensity), the results on wages are quite new in the literature, an exception
being (Walker, 2013), and deserve further comments.23
Note that an increase in energy prices can affect the average wage mostly
through two mechanisms: i. a change in the quality of the workforce, especially
in terms of skills; and ii. a decrease in the rents to be shared between workers
and entrepreneurs. The first channel goes in the direction of increasing the
average wage as we would expect that given the contraction in labor demand,
the less-skilled workers should be fired first.24 The second channel goes in the
opposite direction: unions accept lower wages in the establishments experiencing
a more stringent environmental regulation. Although we estimate a negative and
significant coefficient, de facto the two mechanisms cancel each other out as a
10 percent increase in energy prices would decrease wages by only 0.4 percent.
Two further robustness checks are described in Appendix F: i. results con-
ditional on firm-level changes in demand; and ii. alternative IV based on energy
prices of establishments in the same decile of energy consumption and industry.
21See Adeyemi and Hunt (2007) for a review and estimates on 15 OECD countries and
Agnolucci (2009) for estimates for Germany and the UK.
22The estimated implicit price elasticity of energy consumption for the UK in Martin et al.
(2014) is -1.44 while the price elasticity of energy consumption for Danish firms (Bjorner and
Jensen, 2002) is found to be approximately -0.46.
23Our results are larger than those estimated by Descheˆnes (2011) at the industry-state level
for the US (between -0.097 and -0.156). However, looking at our FE effect results, this result
can be easily explained by the fact that Descheˆnes (2011) cannot find a good instrument to
address endogeneity problems.
24Evidence of a kind of skill bias in environmental technologies is provided in Vona et al.
(2017), especially for engineering and technical skills. In future research, we plan to carry out
a similar analysis with the French micro-data.
17
The first check is intended to test whether all the negative effect on employ-
ment is driven by a scale effect on output as in the related paper by Cox et al.
(2014). The estimated cross-elasticity of employment to energy prices declines
by 1/3 but remains statistically significant at the conventional level. The sec-
ond exercise allows the exogenous variation in price to differ by the decile of
energy consumption and thus capture the heterogeneous impact of reductions
in quantity discounts on different establishments. Again, our results are broadly
consistent with those of our preferred specification.
4.2 Heterogeneous effects
The aggregate results may hide a substantial degree of heterogeneity across
different categories of the establishments’ energy price shocks. We explore this
likely heterogeneity by splitting our sample of firms according to a series of
criteria that allow the delivery of policy-relevant messages.25
First and foremost, we split the sample depending on the energy intensity
of the sector (2-digit NACE) to evaluate the extent to which differences in the
exposure to higher energy costs affects the estimated elasticities. We use as
the threshold the median value of the ratio between energy expenditure and
the wage bill computed for the period 1997-2010 for all sectors (see Appendix
E). Consistent with previous studies (Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Aldy and Pizer,
2015), our expectation is that more energy-intensive sectors are more sensitive
to changes in energy prices than less energy-intensive sectors. The results of
this exercise are reported in Table 5 and fully conform to this expectation,
especially so for employment and wage. The negative and significant effect on
employment and wage is present only in energy-intensive sectors, a result that is
fully in line with those of previous literature (see, e.g., Kahn and Mansur, 2013).
This difference is particularly large for what concerns employment: a 10-percent
increase in energy prices is predicted to reduce establishment-level employment
by 3.2 percent in energy-intensive sectors compared to a statistically insignificant
1.3 percent in other sectors.
[Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Second, we split the sample according to the trade intensity of sectors. The
idea is that sectors that are more exposed to international competition are
more sensitive to changes in energy prices: on the one hand, higher prices of
intermediate inputs like energy can decrease the establishment’s international
competitiveness; on the other hand, sectors more open to trade more easily relo-
cate production to countries with laxer environmental regulations (Ederington
et al., 2005). We employ the trade-related criterion for exemption from auc-
tioning of allowances in the EU ETS introduced by the European Commission
at the 4-digit level (aggregated at the 3-digit level to fit our data) of the NACE
(Rev. 2) classification (see Appendix E). The results split by trade intensity of
the sector are reported in Table 6. Trade intensive sectors are more sensitive to
25An alternative approach would have been to include an interaction term between energy
price and a series of continuous variables such as energy intensity (establishment- or sector-
level) and trade exposure. We did not follow this approach because it would be difficult to
find a convincing instrument for the interaction term. Moreover, if the variable interacted
with energy prices was characterized by extreme values, these values would drive the results
as the interaction term assumes linearity in the relationship.
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energy prices than non-trade intensive sectors concerning energy demand and
employment. This result is again expected because firms cannot easily pass the
increase in unit energy cost to their customers given that the price of their final
product is set on international markets.
Finally, it is interesting to note that climate policies seem equally effective
in reducing CO2 both in establishments likely to be engaged in international
trade and in establishments primarily serving the domestic market, although the
latter achieve a given level of CO2 reduction with a smaller decrease in energy
demand. This gap between reduction in energy demand and CO2 emissions may
reveal different mechanisms through which emission reduction are achieved for
the two groups, with the former more likely to offshoring dirty segments of
the production than the latter (Cherniwchan et al., 2017). Further research
exploiting firm-level data on import is required to shed light on this issue.
4.3 Simulation of policy changes
In this section, we use our estimation results to simulate the effect of a carbon
price policy on the French manufacturing sector. This analysis is motivated
by the fact that, on 17 August 2015, the French parliament approved the so-
called ‘Energy Transition Law’ (Loi relative a` la transition e´nerge´tique pour la
croissance verte, loi no. 2015-992). The law sets a series of ambitious objectives
for climate change mitigation that go beyond those set by the EU (i.e. the 2030
Climate and Energy Framework), such as 40-percent reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions by 2030 (with respect to 1990 levels). As a main tool to achieve
these ambitious goals, the law also set targets for the gradual introduction of a
carbon tax: the carbon tax should have been set to 22 euro per ton of CO2 by
2016, 56 euro per ton of CO2 by 2020 and 100 euro per ton of CO2 by 2030.26
Note that, in addition to planned carbon pricing, the tax rate of the CSPE was
raised substantially after 2010 (last year in our estimates). Overall, the tax
experienced a 4-fold increase (in nominal terms) for the six years after 2010,
resulting in fast increase in tax-inclusive electricity price (see subsection 2.3 for
details).
We use the IV-based elasticities estimated above to provide a counterfac-
tual scenario of the environmental and economic impacts of such policies.27 In
doing so, the most important step is to simulate establishment-specific policy
impacts on energy prices using the establishment-level information on energy
mix and on fuel-specific CO2 intensity for year 2010. As a second step, we can
straightforwardly compute the impact of the policy-induced change in energy
prices on our outcome variables using our estimated elasticities (for all sub-
samples (Tables 5 and 6). To aggregate across establishments, we use sampling
weights for the year 2010 and thus implicitly assume no changes in technology
and inter-establishment input reallocation (see next subsection).
The potential trade-off between environmental goals and labor market out-
comes is evident in the Figures 10 and 11, which respectively report the effect
of the low- (and of the CSPE) and high-carbon taxes. Given the price increases
reported above, the predicted effects are proportional to the elasticities already
reported; thus, we can focus on the policy implications of our exercise. First and
26As of today, the government has not complied with the commitment of introducing the
carbon tax (20 euro per ton).
27A similar exercise is conducted by Aldy and Pizer (2015).
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foremost, large emission reductions on the order of 20 percent to 40 percent (the
target of the French government for the whole economy in 2030) should come
at a cost in terms of employment between 5 percent and 10 percent. The trade-
off is particularly stark for energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries that
would experience employment losses well above 10 percent in the high-carbon
tax scenario. Second, the negative employment effect can be exacerbated if a
carbon tax was implemented without removing the CSPE tax. Although the two
taxes target different energy sources, and thus, their effect on energy prices do
not sum up, the risk of a significant loss of competitiveness for energy-intensive
industries is real and should be considered in the design of the appropriate pol-
icy mix. Finally, while the two figures highlight a negligible impact on earnings,
large employment losses in the ambitious scenario can translate into a decline in
the workers’ bargaining power and thus of wages. Also, negligible average earn-
ing losses can mask significant distributional effect that we plan to investigate
in future research.
4.4 Firm-level results
We repeat our analysis when aggregating the establishment-level data to the
firm level. This process allows us to add to the list of outcome variables a
series of indicators of productivity. Given that energy-related information is
only available for a sample of establishments, we can only keep those firm/year
pairs (including single-establishment firms) for which all establishments were
surveyed in the EACEI.28 Balance sheet and income statement information,
linked by means of the unique firm identifier (SIREN), is retrieved from the
FICUS/FARE databases. We compute two indicators of productivity: the log
of value added per employee and the log of total factor productivity (TFP).29
[Table 7 about here]
Table 7 contains the results of this exercise both for the outcomes variables
evaluated above and for the two new measures of productivity. First of all,
we observe that a more stringent environmental policy has a modest, although
only barely significant, negative effect on both measures of productivity. The
estimated changes predicted by a price increse of 10 percent are between -1
percent (for VA per capita) and -1.2 percent (for TFP) and are smaller than
those estimated in the related paper by Greenstone et al. (2012) also using
firm-level data but for a command-and-control-policy (the US Clean Air Act).
This result suggests that efficiency losses are an issue to worry about in the
design of climate change policy, but at the same time the results do not support
the Porter Hypothesis advocating the use of environmental policies to increase
28As a robustness check, we also repeat our analysis by including those firms for which we
were observing in EACEI establishments that accounted for at least 95, or alternatively, 90
percent of total employees in the firm. The results were confirmed and are available upon
request.
29We estimated TFP using the semi-parametric estimator proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). TFP was estimated for the population of firms by combining information about
employment level from DADS and value added and capital (built with the perpetual inventory
method with sector-specific depreciation) from FICUS/FARE. The results of the estimated
production functions are not reported and remain available upon request.
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competitiveness.30
Second, the results are confirmed for employment, energy and CO2 emis-
sions, while the elasticity on wages is of the same magnitude but imprecisely
estimated. This result is surprising as we should expect at firm level there to
be a reallocation of input towards less-exposed establishments. Note, however,
that our sample of firms fully covered in EACEI is a sub-sample of the sample of
establishments used for our main estimates. Using the same sample of establish-
ments that belong to the sample of firms fully covered by EACEI, Table F3 in
Appendix F shows that firm-level effects are, as expected, smaller in magnitude
than establishment-level effects.
4.5 Within-firm relocation and estimation bounds
As already discussed in the introduction, our analysis focuses on the estimation
of the causal effect of energy price on establishment level performance with no
consideration of how energy price changes within an establishment influence
the relocation of production activities across establishments or across sectors.
However, this aspect is important for understanding how micro-level impacts
translate at the more aggregate level, which is the level that is usually evaluated
by policy makers when assessing the costs and benefits of their policies (Smith,
2015). This is the cost that a researcher usually pays to estimate causal effects.
In particular, our establishment-level estimates implicitly assume that there is
no reallocation of inputs or production across different establishments within
the same industry and between industries. Such reallocation should operate
in the direction of partly compensating the negative economic effect of climate
policies, which means that our simulated counterfactual effects of a carbon tax
are upper bounds of the actual general equilibrium effects.
As the first channel through which our effects are mitigated, establishments
that are able to improve their energy efficiency and thus reduce total energy
demand should become more competitive and increase their employment share.
This behavior is difficult to test directly, but as a first approximation we esti-
mate a simple correlation between the establishment-level variations in energy
and labor demand (filtered by establishment fixed effects and standard con-
trols). The resulting coefficient is modest but positive (0.11), indicating that
establishments that improve their energy efficiency do not in fact grow faster
than establishments that did not improve it.
A second channel is the first level of relocation that a manager would con-
sider, that is moving production from an establishment to another one within
the same company and country.31 Different from single-establishment firms,
multi-establishment firms have a larger and more resilient internal labor market
as they have the possibility of choosing which establishment should be more
or less engaged in production in response to, among other factors, differences
in input prices across establishments (Cestone et al., 2016). More specifically,
30This finding is also in line with recent evidence about the impact of the EU ETS on firm
performance (see e.g. Marin et al., 2017).
31Cestone et al. (2016) study labor reallocation across French firms belonging to the same
business group, and thus, at a higher level than ours. A group-level analysis is more appro-
priate for studying the propagation of shocks within internal labor markets but is infeasible
in our case because EACEI contains only a few firms for which establishments are fully ob-
served. Consequently, the number of groups that are fully observed would decline at a level
that makes a group-level analysis infeasible.
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if a particular establishment is hit by an idiosyncratic energy price shock, the
manager of a multi-establishment firm can have some margins to reduce the
level of production of that establishment and at the same time to increase the
production in other establishments. This change will mitigate the aggregate
effect of the price shock.
Fortunately, our data display enough between-establishment within-firm vari-
ation in energy prices to estimate this relocation effect for a specific sub-sample
of firms that are fully observed in the EACEI survey (but excluding single-
establishment firms).32 To illustrate, the within-firm between-establishment
standard deviation in energy prices, which is the source of variation that we
exploit to estimate relocation effect, is still quite large with a value of 0.168 as
opposed to 0.310 for this specific sub-sample.
To evaluate and quantify within-firm reallocation, we estimate the following
equation:
Input sharei∈j,t = βlog(pEi∈j,t) + γjt + αi + it, (7)
where Input sharei∈j,t is the share of input (either energy consumption or la-
bor) used in establishment i belonging to firm j over the total input used in
firm j in year t, log(pEi∈j,t) is the logarithm of energy price for establishment i
belonging to firm j in year t, γjt is the year-specific fixed effect for firm j, αi is
the establishment fixed effect and it is the idiosyncratic error component. By
conditioning on year-firm fixed effect, we consider only the within-firm variation
across establishments in both the outcome variable and energy prices which is
the same as considering the gap between establishment energy price and firm
average energy price. Concerning the instrumental variable, we follow the same
approach as for our baseline results.
The following caveat is important at this point: the results should be inter-
preted with particular care as these conditions imply a non-random selection of
establishments, reducing the representativeness of the selected sample. Com-
pared to the average establishment in the full sample, these establishments are
26.9 percent larger in terms of number of employees and report an energy con-
sumption that is 97.2 percent larger.
[Table 8 about here]
The results are reported in Table 8. The results are in line with the expecta-
tions that our estimated elasticities are upper bounds of the aggregated effects
of energy prices. Starting with energy, we observe that an increase in energy
prices of 10 percent in establishment i reduces its share in total energy use in
firm j (to which i belongs) by approximately 3.37 percent. On the other hand,
the same increase in energy prices only reduces the share of labor in establish-
ment i over total employment in firm j by 1.06 percent. This difference between
32In single-establishment firms, there is no scope for input reallocation. The sub-sample used
in this analysis comprises the firms that satisfy the following conditions: i. all establishments
of the firm were surveyed in the EACEI in year t; ii. the establishments are observed at
least two times in the period 2000-2010; and iii. there is an additional observation for the
establishment at least three years before the second observation (to be able to build the
IV; see section 3.2). By applying these criteria, we rely on an unbalanced panel of 1,334
establishments that belong to 571 firms.
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energy and labor can be associated with two different explanations. First, sim-
ilar to what was observed in our baseline results (Table 4), energy consumption
is more sensitive to energy prices than employment. Secondly, energy as an
input is more mobile than labor: firms will not easily move workers from one
establishment to the other while increasing production and consequently energy
use in a specific establishment is easier for the firm.
5 Conclusions
Our paper provides evidence on the link between energy prices and various
measures of economic and environmental performance for a panel of French
manufacturing establishments. After discussing the features of the French man-
ufacturing sector in terms of energy use and energy prices and the main policy
changes occurred within the estimation period, we build an empirical framework
that is suited to deal with potential endogeneity of energy prices and estimate
their impact on different performance variable.
Our results identify a trade-off between environmental and economic goals
due to changing energy prices. We estimate that a 10-percent increase in
establishment-level energy prices brings to a 6.4 percent reduction in energy
consumption and to a 11.5 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. At the same
time, the same 10-percent increase in energy prices has a modest negative impact
on employment (-2.6 percent) and an even smaller effect on wages (-0.4 percent)
and on firm’s productivity (-1.1 percent). The negative employment effect differ
across sectors depending on their energy intensity and their exposure to interna-
tional trade, with the effect being larger in magnitude for energy-intensive and
trade-exposed sectors. Simulating the effect of a carbon tax, we show that job
losses for the most exposed sectors can be quite large and, in absence of com-
pensating labor market policies, may justify the opposition of specific lobbies
to climate change policies.
Our approach focuses on just one dimension of the impact of environmental
regulation on environmental and economic performance, as we do not consider
the consequences of reallocation of inputs and production across establishments
(within sector) with different energy prices and we also shut down the possibil-
ity of structural change induced by changing energy prices. When considering
within-firm between-establishment reallocation of inputs in response to energy
price changes, we observe that there exists a substantial shift of inputs towards
less exposed establishments. This preliminary analysis leads us to think that the
estimated negative effect of climate policies on employment is an upper bound,
but obviously further research is required in this direction.
Further research is also needed in this framework to provide a more com-
prehensive picture of the different mechanisms through which changing energy
prices translate in macro-level changes in environmental and economic perfor-
mance. Our focus here is on the most disaggregated unit of analysis, that is
the establishment. The reallocation of inputs and output across establishments
within the same sector would require very detailed data on the population of
establishments (of firms) within a sector and the use of decomposition tech-
niques similar to the ones used to estimate aggregate total factor productivity
growth from microdata (see e.g. Petrin and Levinsohn, 2012). On the other
hand, general equilibrium modelling is required to provide evidence about the
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relevance of structural change induced by changing energy prices.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Sector-level information
Sector Energy
expend /
wages
Average
energy
price per
kWh
Average
electr
price per
kWh
Average
gas price
per kWh
Average
electr
share
Average
gas share
13 Textiles 0.323 0.048 0.068 0.03 0.497 0.347
(0.524) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.317) (0.351)
14 Wearing apparel 0.081 0.061 0.081 0.033 0.531 0.24
(0.173) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.307) (0.311)
15 Leather and related products 0.086 0.059 0.078 0.035 0.557 0.196
(0.174) (0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.264) (0.278)
16 Wood and of products of wood and cork 0.338 0.064 0.074 0.034 0.736 0.073
(0.619) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.258) (0.191)
17 Paper and paper products 0.284 0.049 0.066 0.03 0.509 0.321
(0.507) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.276) (0.313)
18 Coke and refined petroleum products 0.197 0.061 0.071 0.034 0.728 0.195
(0.390) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.248) (0.239)
20 Chemicals and chemical products 0.378 0.047 0.064 0.03 0.475 0.335
(0.884) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.292) (0.324)
21 Basic pharmaceutical products 0.144 0.046 0.058 0.029 0.555 0.37
(0.277) (0.014) (0.013) (0.009) (0.227) (0.256)
22 Rubber and plastic products 0.238 0.055 0.064 0.033 0.721 0.177
(0.391) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.286) (0.263)
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.367 0.049 0.067 0.028 0.471 0.294
(0.590) (0.021) (0.018) (0.010) (0.320) (0.356)
24 Basic metals 0.381 0.046 0.062 0.029 0.5 0.342
(0.619) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.258) (0.294)
25 Fabricated metal products 0.207 0.059 0.074 0.034 0.628 0.237
(0.451) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.272) (0.279)
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 0.127 0.061 0.072 0.034 0.727 0.194
(0.683) (0.019) (0.020) (0.011) (0.272) (0.254)
27 Electrical equipment 0.135 0.056 0.071 0.033 0.605 0.289
(0.358) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.270) (0.285)
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.144 0.058 0.077 0.035 0.524 0.317
(0.310) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.266) (0.304)
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.164 0.054 0.072 0.033 0.543 0.297
(0.368) (0.016) (0.020) (0.010) (0.261) (0.292)
30 Other transport equipment 0.101 0.054 0.072 0.033 0.523 0.345
(0.315) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.258) (0.290)
31 Furniture 0.205 0.062 0.077 0.034 0.634 0.191
(0.359) (0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.297) (0.290)
32 Other manufacturing 0.112 0.062 0.077 0.035 0.655 0.227
(0.187) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.287) (0.280)
33 Repair and installation 0.156 0.068 0.086 0.037 0.606 0.213
(0.399) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.312) (0.293)
Total 0.217 0.057 0.072 0.033 0.601 0.251
(0.482) (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.293) (0.297)
Standard deviation in parenthesis. Own elaboration on EACEI and DADS data. Information refers to the period 1997-2010 and is
weighted by sampling weights across establishments.
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Table 2: Impact of policies on energy prices and energy mix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(pE) log(pE) log(pE) log(pE) Electr Gas
share share
PMR 0.122*** 0.118***
(1: regulated; 0: unregulated) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Firm-specific CSPE (euro/MWh) -18.24*** -8.800*** -4.489** 13.03***
(2.916) (2.994) (1.882) (2.451)
ETS x D(2001-2004) 0.0898*** 0.0741*** 0.000308 0.0205*
(0.0125) (0.0124) (0.00614) (0.0122)
ETS x D(2005-2007) 0.173*** 0.151*** 0.00310 0.00445
(0.0175) (0.0179) (0.0104) (0.0184)
ETS x D(2008-2010) 0.209*** 0.190*** 0.0110 0.000471
(0.0189) (0.0193) (0.126) (0.0211)
N 115639 115639 115639 115639 115639 115639
Fixed effect model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional control
variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies, year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3)
dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dummies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least
two years
Table 3: Differences in employment patterns for establishments with different
initial energy mix
Dep var: log(empl) (1) (2)
Initial electricity share x D1998 0.0200 0.00151
(0.0147) (0.0155)
Initial electricity share x D1999 0.0219 -0.00515
(0.0215) (0.0228)
Initial electricity share x D2000 0.0798*** 0.0277
(0.0225) (0.0237)
Initial electricity share x D2001 0.0780** 0.0329
(0.0317) (0.0335)
Initial gas share x D1998 0.0120 0.00742
(0.0143) (0.0148)
Initial gas share x D1999 -0.000556 -0.00402
(0.0199) (0.0203)
Initial gas share x D2000 0.00478 -0.00901
(0.0222) (0.0223)
Initial gas share x D2001 0.00289 0.000620
(0.0309) (0.0310)
N 43070 43070
F test: joint significance of electr share 4.078 0.817
p-value 0.00264 0.514
F test: joint significance of gas share 0.279 0.265
p-value 0.892 0.901
F test: joint significance of electr and shares 3.180 1.008
p-value 0.00133 0.427
Fixed effect model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Year dummies included. Additional control vari-
ables included in column (2): year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region
(NUTS2) dummies, year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size
(initial size classes) dummies. Sample: establishment in EACEI 1997 that
were observed in DADS in all years for the period 1997-2001
Table 4: Baseline results
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.218*** -0.644*** -1.735*** -1.149***
(0.0308) (0.0780) (0.0553) (0.117)
F excl IV first stage 1393.9 1151.0
N 61153 61153 54437 54437
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0742*** -0.263*** -0.00267 -0.0445**
(0.0152) (0.0593) (0.00399) (0.0174)
F excl IV first stage 1393.9 1423.2
N 61153 61153 59076 59076
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the ini-
tial energy mix for the IV). Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source)
weighted with initial energy mix of the plant.
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Table 5: Results by energy intensity of the sector
Energy intensive sectors
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.226*** -0.680*** -1.732*** -1.205***
(0.0437) (0.0964) (0.0797) (0.144)
F excl IV first stage 855.1 716.7
N 32864 32864 28967 28967
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0757*** -0.318*** -0.000684 -0.0524**
(0.0180) (0.0683) (0.00514) (0.0211)
F excl IV first stage 855.1 912.0
N 32864 32864 31835 31835
Non energy intensive sectors
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.198*** -0.462*** -1.732*** -0.984***
(0.0399) (0.133) (0.0646) (0.205)
F excl IV first stage 534.5 436.3
N 28289 28289 25470 25470
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0687** -0.130 -0.00628 -0.0246
(0.0268) (0.114) (0.00638) (0.0308)
F excl IV first stage 534.5 503.2
N 28289 28289 27241 27241
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the ini-
tial energy mix for the IV). Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source)
weighted with initial energy mix of the plant.
Table 6: Results for trade intensive and non trade intensive sectors
Trade intensive sectors
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.247*** -0.790*** -1.649*** -1.146***
(0.0540) (0.124) (0.0913) (0.174)
F excl IV first stage 573.0 491.2
N 24461 24461 22189 22189
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0844*** -0.308*** -0.00467 -0.0420
(0.0247) (0.100) (0.00626) (0.0295)
F excl IV first stage 573.0 559.8
N 24461 24461 23604 23604
Non trade intensive sectors
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.202*** -0.538*** -1.796*** -1.122***
(0.0371) (0.104) (0.0649) (0.166)
F excl IV first stage 724.1 578.7
N 36692 36692 32248 32248
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0613*** -0163** -0.000307 -0.0521**
(0.0194) (0.0770) (0.00518) (0.0223)
F excl IV first stage 724.1 764.8
N 36692 36692 35472 35472
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the ini-
tial energy mix for the IV). Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source)
weighted with initial energy mix of the plant.
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Table 7: Results for firm-level measures
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.221*** -0.528*** -1.838*** -1.049***
(0.0434) (0.113) (0.0700) (0.178)
F excl IV first stage 829.9 619.2
N 30600 30600 26738 26738
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0915*** -0.262*** 0.00655 -0.0447
(0.0143) (0.0447) (0.0172) (0.0580)
F excl IV first stage 813.4 804.1
N 30355 30355 30045 30045
log(VA / empl) log(TFP)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0154 -0.106 -0.0302 -0.122
(0.0224) (0.0845) (0.0206) (0.0793)
F excl IV first stage 806.9 795.4
N 29862 29862 29438 29438
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source) weighted with initial
energy mix of the plant. Sample: firms for which all plants are included in EACEI
and that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and observations three years or
more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the initial energy mix for the IV).
Table 8: Within-firm relocation
Establishment share of firm
energy consumption
Establishment share of firm
employment
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.374*** -0.337*** -0.0718*** -0.106**
(0.0343) (0.0622) (0.0214) (0.0420)
F excl IV first stage 140.5 137.0
N 5217 5217 5144 5144
Fixed effect model. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Additional control variables: firm-year dummies. Excluded IV: log of national
energy prices (by source) weighted with initial energy mix of the plant. Sample: plants in
multi-plant firms for which all plants are observed in EACEI; plants that are observed in
EACEI for at least two years.
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Figure 1: Average electricity price (euro per MWh) for industrial customers by
yearly consumption band (year 2010, source: Eurostat)
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Figure 2: Average energy mix of French manufacturing establishments
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Own elaboration on EACEI data. Average energy mix weighted by sampling weights. The ‘Other’ category includes:
heavy oil, oil, steam, coke, other gas, coke-petrol, lignite.
32
Figure 3: Average energy prices of French manufacturing establishments
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Own elaboration on EACEI data. Average energy prices weighted by sampling and energy consumption weights.
Figure 4: Standard deviation of establishment-level log energy prices (total and
electricity)
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Own elaboration on EACEI data. Year-by-year standard deviation weighted by sampling and energy consumption
(total and electricity, respectively) weights.
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Figure 5: Decomposition of standard deviation of establishment-level log energy
prices (total - upper panel - and electricity - lower panel)
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Own elaboration on EACEI data. Ratio between year-by-year standard deviation across categories and overall
standard deviation, weighted by sampling and energy consumption (total and electricity, respectively) weights.
34
Figure 6: Quantity discount for energy (total and electricity)
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Own elaboration on EACEI data. Year-by-year elasticity (absolute value) of energy price with respect to en-
ergy consumption conditional on sector dummies (2-digit NACE) and region dummies (NUTS2). Regressions are
weighted by energy consumption and sampling weights.
Figure 7: Product market regulation index in the electricity (left) and gas (right)
sectors
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Figure 8: Predicted impact on average energy prices of policy changes (carbon
tax of 56 euro per ton of CO2 and CSPE of 22.5 euro per MWh)
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Figure 9: Predicted impact on average energy prices of policy changes (carbon
tax of 100 euro per ton of CO2)
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Figure 10: Predicted impact on outcome variables of policy changes (carbon tax
of 56 euro per ton of CO2 and CSPE of 22.5 euro per MWh)
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Figure 11: Predicted impact on outcome variables of policy changes (carbon tax
of 100 euro per ton of CO2)
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A Data sources
The main source of data is the EACEI survey. The EACEI (Enqueˆte sur les
consommations d’e´nergie dans l’industrie) is a survey to manufacturing estab-
lishments that provides information on energy consumption (quantity and value)
broken down by energy type: electricity (consumed and auto-produced), steam,
natural gas, other types of gas, coal, lignite, coke, propane, butane, heavy fuel
oil, heating oil and other petroleum products.33 In the first part of our period
(1997-2010), sectors 10-12 (Manufacture of food products, beverages and to-
bacco products, NACE Rev 2) were not included in the survey design. We
thus exclude establishments in these sectors also in the second part of our
panel. From 2007 onwards, other non-manufacturing industrial sectors were
included (e.g. 38.3 ‘Material recovery’). We also exclude these additional non-
manufacturing sectors. All establishments with more than 250 employees are
requested to participate to the survey (Wagner et al., 2014, plus all establish-
ments with more than 10 or 20 employees in specific energy-intensive sectors,
see[for further details) while only a sample establishments with 20 or more em-
ployees is interviewed. The response rate is nearly 90 percent.
Information on establishment-level total wages paid and average wages were
retrieved form the DADS (De´claration Annuelle des donne´es Sociales) database,
that is an administrative collection of data on employment and wages for the
population of French establishments. We linked information in EACEI with
information in DADS by means of the unique identifier of French establishments
(SIRET).
Balance sheet information for French firms was retrieved from the FICUS
(Fichier de comptabilite´ unifie´ dans SUSE, 1997-2007) and FARE (Fichier ap-
proche´ des re´sultats d’Esane 2008-2010) databases, that contain information on
balance sheets and income statements for the population of French firms. Firm-
level data from FICUS/FARE were linked to EACEI and DADS based on the
unique identifier of French firms (SIREN).
B Characteristics of the estimation sample
The characteristics of the estimation sample that we employed in our baseline
results are reported in Table B1. Overall, the largest possible estimation sample
for the period 2000-2010 consisted of 89769 observations (establishment/year).
Our estimation sample for total energy and employment included 61153 ob-
servations, that is about 68 percent of the total. These selected observations
represent 68.1 percent of the total number of possible observations but account
for as much as 73 percent of energy consumption and 74 percent of employment
(see Table B1).
[Table B1 about here]
33For what concerns auto-produced of electricity, our measure of total energy consumption
accounts for the fuels employed in self production while it does not consider electricity self-
produced to avoid double counting. Over total electricity consumption (purchased from the
grid and self produced), self produced electricity only accounts for 6.6 percent. Overall, self
produced electricity represents more than 1 percent (10 percent) of total electricity use for 4.5
percent (1.7 percent) of establishment-year pairs.
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To gain a more precise understanding of the bias brought about this sample
selection, we regress a series of variables on a dummy variable that equals one
for observations in the selected sample and zero otherwise. Results are reported
in Table B2. Conditional on year dummies, selected establishments are larger in
terms of employees (39.1 log points, 47.8 percent), consume more energy (113.8
log points, 212.1 percent) and are more energy intensive in terms of energy con-
sumption per worker (74.8 log points, 111.3 percent). On average, conditioning
on total energy consumption (to account for quantity discounts), energy prices
were smaller in selected establishments (2.3 log points, 2.3 percent). A slightly
larger difference (3.2 log points, 3.1 percent) is estimated for electricity prices
(conditioning here on total electricity consumption).
[Table B2 about here]
C Further results on the dynamics of quantity
discounts
We further refine our assessment of the elasticity of energy price to quantity by
estimating an econometric model that accounts for establishment fixed effects,
αi, and directly allows testing for the significance in the elasticity changes:
log(pEit) = αi +
2010∑
s=1998
βs log(Energy usei,t=0)×Ds +
+ X ′itγ + it, (8)
where log(pEit) is the average unit cost of energy (in log) in year t for establish-
ment i, log(Energy usei,t=0) is the logarithm of energy consumption of estab-
lishment i in the first year in which the establishment is observed in EACEI, Ds
is a dummy variable that equals one in year s, it is the idiosyncratic error term
and Xit is a vector of control variables that account for a variety of unobserved
year-specific effects34. Using 1997 as the base year, βˆs represent the within-
establishment change in the elasticity of electricity prices to quantity between
1997 and year s. Positive values indicate a reduction in the quantity discount.
[Figure C1 about here]
Estimated βˆs are reported in Figure C1 (with 95 percent confidence inter-
vals). Results suggest that quantity discounts for electricity remained constant
up to year 2001 and decreased significantly thereafter. More specifically, in 2006
the quantity discount decreased of approximately 3 percentage points with re-
spect to the base year (2.1 percent in 2010). These estimates implies that an
important fraction of the reduction in quantity discount occurred within estab-
lishments rather than being associated to within-sector compositional change or
to the fact that above-average prices are charged to new establishments.
34We interact year dummies with the following set of dummies: sector dummies (NACE
rev 2, 2 digit), region dummies (NUTS2) and ETS dummies (equal to 1 for establishments
covered by the EU ETS).
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D Discontinuity in CSPE and impact on elec-
tricity prices
The CSPE tax creates a partial discontinuity in the schedule of marginal tax
but does not create any discontinuities in the distribution of the average tax per
MWh, thus avoiding potential distortions due to strategic behaviours. We check
for the presence of a possible discontinuity in the relationship between the level
of energy consumption and energy prices around the level of energy consumption
(in MWh/year) beyond which each additional kWh of electricity purchased is
exempted from the CSPE.35 We evaluate the presence of a discontinuity by
fitting a linear relationship between energy consumption (100 Mhw above and
below the threshold) and prices for 2000 (before the CSPE), 2003 (second year
of the CSPE), 2004 (year in which the tax rate has increased to 4.5 euro/MWh,
moving the threshold for exemption) and 2010 (last year of the dataset). We
allow the linear relationship to differ below and above the threshold.
[Figure D1 about here]
If anything, we should expect that tax-inclusive electricity prices just above
the threshold should be systematically smaller than just below the threshold.
Results, reported in Figure D1, point to the opposite direction: while no signif-
icant discontinuity is found in 2000 (as expected) and 2003, the discontinuity
is statistically significant for 2004 and 2010 but at odds with our expectations.
Tax-inclusive electricity prices just above the threshold in these years are greater
than just below the threshold. This striking result, that is consistent with the
observed reduction in the heterogeneity of electricity prices (Figure 4) and the
decreasing size of quantity discount (Figure 6), suggests that EDF completely
incorporated in its tax-inclusive tariffs the average value of the tax and, at the
same time, decided to increase (in relative terms) the price charged to large
industrial consumers of electricity. Overall, the various different descriptive ev-
idences discussed above point to a counter-intuitive effect of the CSPE: despite
partial exemptions for large consumers of electricity, the change of the pre-tax
price structure of electricity more than compensated the impact of the exemp-
tion from the CSPE.
E Energy intensive and trade intensive sectors
To identify energy-intensive sectors, we compute the average ratio between
establishment-level energy expenditure and establishment-level total wages for
each 2-digit NACE sector. We compute the average by weighting for the rela-
tive importance of each establishment within the sector in terms of wages paid.
Sectors above the median of relevance of energy expenditure are identified as
energy intensive. The full list of 2-digit NACE sectors broken down by energy
intensity is reported in Table E1.
[Table E1 about here]
35As the overall plafond is fixed and the tax rate changes over time, the threshold in terms
of electricity consumption above which the marginal tax collapses to zero changes in time
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To identify trade-intensive sectors we employ one of the criteria used by the
European Commission to exempt from auctioning of allowances (from the third
phase 2013-2020) establishments in those sectors that were deemed to be at risk
of carbon leakage (Decision 2010/2/EU, amended by the Decisions 2012/498/EU
and 2014/9/EU). These criteria considered the CO2 emission intensity of the
sector and its exposure to extra-EU28 trade. We identify trade-intensive sectors
those for which trade (import plus export) with non-EU28 countries is larger
than 10 percent of the total EU28 production in that sector.36. A comprehensive
evaluation of the link between exposure to carbon leakage and effective risks of
job losses is done by Martin et al. (2014).
[Table E2 about here]
F Robustness checks
As a first robustness check, we want to see if our estimated elasticities are fully
driven by a scale effect. For instance, as in Cox et al. (2014), the negative ef-
fect of energy prices on employment can be fully mediated by a negative effect
of energy prices on the scale of firm operation. The same argument holds for
energy demand. Our proxy of scale is the value of firm production (turnover).
Notice that this is not our favourite estimate for two important reasons. First,
our proxy of scale is likely to be endogenous as energy and labor inputs di-
rectly influence firm-level production and turnover. Second, we can only observe
turnover for firms and not for each establishment. Results are reported in Table
F1. As expected, for all outcome variables except average wages, accounting for
turnover results in a small reduction in the magnitude of estimated elasticities
of outcome variables to energy prices. This result suggests that part of the
overall effect estimated in our main specification are explained by an induced
scale effect.
[Table F1 about here]
Using a lag of three years in computing the energy mix for our IV may not
be enough to ensure the exogeneity of the instrument as the energy mix is very
persistent within establishment. As a second sensitivity test, we build an al-
ternative IV that is not based on establishment-specific data but exploits more
general systematic difference across establishments belonging to different deciles
of total energy consumption and industries. For each decile of energy consump-
tion and sector (2-digit NACE), we compute the average energy mix for years
1997-1999. The idea is that, for technological reasons, firms belonging to dif-
ferent sectors and, within the sector, to different deciles of energy consumption
should be characterized by a reduced set of viable technological choices in terms
of energy mix. We then use this estimated energy mix to compute the weighted
average of energy prices for each cell decile of energy consumption-sector and
each year.
[Table F2 about here]
36The list is available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage en
(last accessed: July 2017)
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Results are reported in Table F2. Across the board, estimated elasticities
with this new IV appear to be slightly smaller than the ones estimated in Table
4 and the precision of estimates is also lower (i.e. higher standard errors) due
to the weaker correlation between the IV and the endogenous variable. The
difference in point coefficients is particularly large for CO2 emissions, while
the elasticity of average wages per employees is now not statistically different
from zero. It should be noted, however, that these results are not statistically
different from the ones arising from our baseline estimates.
[Table F3 about here]
Another robustness check consists in providing a benchmark of establishment-
level estimates for the sample of firms that were analyzed in the firm-level anal-
ysis of section 4.4. Results for this sub-sample are reported in Table F3 and
suggest that, with the exception of CO2 emissions, the magnitude of estimated
point coefficients is larger for establishment-level than for firm-level estimates.
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Tables and figures of appendixes
Table B1: Characteristics of the estimation sample
Potential number of observations (2000-2010) 89769
Observations in the estimation sample 61153
Share of ‘selected’ observations over total observations 0.6812
Share of energy consumption in ‘selected observations’ (over total energy consumption) 0.7296
Share of labor in ‘selected’ observations (over total labor) 0.7371
Table B2: Differences between estimation sample and overall population
Dep var log(empl) log(ener cons) log(ener cons / L) log(energy price) log(electr price)
Dummy: selected sample 0.391*** 1.138*** 0.748*** -0.0231*** -0.0316***
(0.0106) (0.0224) (0.0188) (0.00319) (0.00295)
log(ener consumption) -0.124***
(0.00102)
log(electr consumption) -0.0101***
(0.000938)
N 89796 89796 89796 89796 89796
OLS pooled model weighted with sampling weights. Year dummies included. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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Figure C1: Reduction in quantity discount for energy prices with respect to
1997
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Figure D1: Regression discontinuity design around the threshold for the exemp-
tion from the CSPE
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Table E1: Energy intensity of 2-digit sectors based on the average ratio between
energy expenditure and wages paid
High energy intensity
13 Manufacture of textiles
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
18 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
24 Manufacture of basic metals
Low energy intensity
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
15 Manufacture of leather and related products
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
31 Manufacture of furniture
32 Other manufacturing
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
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Table E2: Trade intensity of 3-digit sectors based on EU ETS criterion for
exemption from auctioning
High trade intensity
13.1 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres
13.2 Weaving of textiles
13.9 Manufacture of other textiles
14.1 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel
14.3 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted apparel
15.1 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness; dressing and dyeing of fur
20.1 Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms
20.2 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products
20.5 Manufacture of other chemical products
20.6 Manufacture of man-made fibres
21.1 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
21.2 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations
22.1 Manufacture of rubber products
23.2 Manufacture of refractory products
23.4 Manufacture of other porcelain and ceramic products
24.2 Manufacture of tubes, pipes, hollow profiles and related fittings, of steel
24.4 Manufacture of basic precious and other non-ferrous metals
25.4 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
25.7 Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware
26.1 Manufacture of electronic components and boards
26.2 Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment
26.3 Manufacture of communication equipment
27.1 Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and electricity distribution and control apparatus
27.3 Manufacture of wiring and wiring devices
27.4 Manufacture of electric lighting equipment
27.5 Manufacture of domestic appliances
27.9 Manufacture of other electrical equipment
28.1 Manufacture of general-purpose machinery
28.2 Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery
28.3 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery
28.4 Manufacture of metal forming machinery and machine tools
28.9 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery
29.1 Manufacture of motor vehicles
30.1 Building of ships and boats
30.3 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery
30.9 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c.
32.2 Manufacture of musical instruments
32.3 Manufacture of sports goods
32.5 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies
Low trade intensity
13.3 Finishing of textiles
14.2 Manufacture of articles of fur
15.2 Manufacture of footwear
16.1 Sawmilling and planing of wood
16.2 Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials
17.1 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
17.2 Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard
18.1 Printing and service activities related to printing
18.2 Reproduction of recorded media
20.3 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics
20.4 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations
22.2 Manufacture of plastic products
23.1 Manufacture of glass and glass products
23.3 Manufacture of clay building materials
23.5 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster
23.6 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster
23.7 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
23.9 Manufacture of abrasive products and non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
24.1 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys
24.3 Manufacture of other products of first processing of steel
24.5 Casting of metals
25.1 Manufacture of structural metal products
25.2 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal
25.3 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
25.5 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy
25.6 Treatment and coating of metals; machining
25.9 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products
26.5 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation; watches and clocks
26.6 Manufacture of irradiation, electromedical and electrotherapeutic equipment
26.7 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment
26.8 Manufacture of magnetic and optical media
27.2 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators
29.2 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers
29.3 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles
30.2 Manufacture of railway locomotives and rolling stock
30.4 Manufacture of military fighting vehicles
31.0 Manufacture of furniture
32.1 Manufacture of jewellery, bijouterie and related articles
32.4 Manufacture of games and toys
32.9 Manufacturing n.e.c.
33.1 Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment
33.2 Installation of industrial machinery and equipment
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Table F1: Results conditional on firm’s turnover
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.202*** -0.607*** -1.726*** -1.119***
(0.0308) (0.0782) (0.0552) (0.118)
log(turnover - firm) 0.190*** 0.203*** 0.165*** 0.176***
(0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0161) (0.0136)
F excl IV first stage 1370.5 1132.5
N 60600 60600 53978 53978
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0444*** -0.164*** -0.00259 -0.0458***
(0.0143) (0.0533) (0.00397) (0.0174)
log(turnover - firm) 0.340*** 0.338*** 0.00787 0.00694
(0.0169) (0.0150) (0.00545) (0.00507)
F excl IV first stage 1370.5 1409.6
N 60600 60600 58806 58806
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the ini-
tial energy mix for the IV). Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source)
weighted with initial energy mix of the plant.
Table F2: Results using an alternative IV based on industry/decile of energy
consumption energy mix
log(energy cons) log(CO2) log(empl) log(average wage
per empl)
log(energy price) -0.582*** -0.813*** -0.194** -0.0320
(0.0940) (0.151) (0.0753) (0.0221)
F excl IV first stage 988.3 820.8 988.3 959.8
N 61153 54437 61153 59076
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional control variables: year-sector
(2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies, year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size
(initial size classes) dummies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI. Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by
source) weighted with average 1997-1999 energy mix of the sector/decile of energy consumption cell.
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Table F3: Establishment-level results on the sample
log(energy cons) log(CO2)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -1.264*** -0.674*** -1.836*** -0.955***
(0.0398) (0.101) (0.0771) (0.161)
F excl IV first stage 856.9 684.5
N 33165 33165 28888 28888
log(empl) log(average wage per empl)
FE FE-IV FE FE-IV
log(energy price) -0.0861*** -0.315*** -0.00726 -0.0567**
(0.0190) (0.0791) (0.00525) (0.0228)
F excl IV first stage 856.9 832.1
N 33165 33165 32164 32164
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Additional
control variables: year-sector (2-digit NACE rev 2), year-region (NUTS2) dummies,
year-ETS dummies, year-peak (>Q3) dummies, year-size (initial size classes) dum-
mies. Sample: establishment that are observed in EACEI for at least two years and
observations three years or more after the first year in EACEI (used to build the ini-
tial energy mix for the IV). Excluded IV: log of national energy prices (by source)
weighted with initial energy mix of the plant.
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